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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Garrett M. McCoy appeals from the judgment of the district court entered upon
the jury verdict finding him guilty of grand theft by possession of stolen property. On
appeal McCoy claims, for the first time, that the jury instructions contained a fatal
variance rising to the level of fundamental error.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On the morning of November 4, 2016, John Walker, a high school junior, went
outside to warm up his family’s 2014 Honda Ridgeline truck. (9/28/17 Tr., p. 179, L. 18
– p. 186, L. 4.) Mr. Walker lived in Nampa. (Id.) Mr. Walker went back inside to wait
for his grandfather and left the truck unlocked. (Id.) About 20 minutes later, when Mr.
Walker came back outside, the truck was gone. (Id.) Mr. Walker called the Nampa
police. (9/28/17 Tr., p.186, L. 10 – p. 187, L. 5.)
While Mr. Walker was inside, McCoy had seen the truck idling in the driveway
and was “drawn to it.” (9/28/17 Tr., p. 252, L. 24 – p. 255, L. 21.) McCoy took the truck
and drove it around before eventually parking it in a lot in Garden City. (Id.)
At approximately 5:00 p.m on the same day, Officer Sol, a public safety aide for
Garden City, saw the truck, along with some other vehicles, parked in a vacant lot.
(9/28/17 Tr., p. 228, L. 12 – p. 232, L. 23.) Officer Sole ran the VIN number on the 2014
Honda Ridgeline and it came back as the Walkers’ stolen truck. (Id.) Sergeant Otter was
dispatched to Officer Sol’s report of a stolen vehicle. (9/28/17 Tr., p. 243, L. 20 – p. 246,
L. 24; Ex. 1.) Sergeant Otter arrived on scene and confirmed through dispatch that the
2014 Honda Ridgeline was reported stolen out of Nampa. (Id.)
1

As Sergeant Otter was on the phone with Nampa police, an individual later
identified as McCoy came walking towards the parking lot. (9/28/17 Tr., p. 247, L. 6 –
p. 250, L. 16.) McCoy was walking towards the stolen truck. (Id.) McCoy did not seem
to want to make eye contact with Sergeant Otter and was trying to walk away. (Id.)
Sergeant Otter said “hi” and McCoy stopped, pointed at the stolen truck and asked, “Did
you find the keys to my vehicle?” (Id.) McCoy said the truck was his, but then when
Sergeant Otter asked if he was the registered owner, McCoy changed his story and said he
had borrowed the truck. (Id.)
After the backup officer, Officer Pierce, arrived, Sergeant Otter detained McCoy
and read him Miranda 1 warnings. (9/28/17 Tr., p. 252, L. 20 – p. 255, L. 21.) McCoy
then said he had leased the truck, but could not identify where he had leased the vehicle
from. (Id.) McCoy then said that the car had spoken to him and he took the vehicle from
Nampa. (Id.) McCoy said he was drawn to the vehicle and he drove it around before he
parked it. (Id.) McCoy admitted he stole the vehicle. (Id.) The state charged McCoy
with grand theft by possession of stolen property with a persistent violator enhancement.
(R., pp. 26-27, 73-74, 100-101.)
At the preliminary hearing, Chanmaly Walker testified, that on November 4, 2016
her truck was taken out of her driveway as her son was getting ready for school. (12/6/16
Tr., p. 4, L. 17 – p. 7, L. 17.) Sergeant Otter testified that McCoy admitted to him that he
stole the truck. (12/6/16 Tr., p. 11, L. 19 – p. 15, L. 6.) McCoy told Sergeant Otter that
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Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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he was in Nampa and the truck was “calling out to him,” so he took it. (12/6/16 Tr., p.
13, L. 20 – p. 15, L. 6.)
McCoy’s defense at trial was that he was only guilty of misdemeanor joyriding.
(See,
e.g.,
--- 9/28/17 Tr., p. 143, L. 15 – p. 146, L. 24, p. 271, L. 3 – p. 275, L. 17, p. 324, L.
13 – p. 332, L. 14.) During the argument regarding jury instructions, McCoy objected to
Instruction No. 14, the elements of grand theft by possession of stolen property.
Specifically, McCoy argued the instruction should not include language allowing the jury
to find him guilty of grand theft by possession of stolen property, because the evidence
showed he took the truck from the victims’ driveway and there was no evidence that the
truck was stolen by someone else and then picked up by McCoy. (9/28/17 Tr., p. 287, Ls.
3-18.) The district court overruled the objection, but granted McCoy’s request to instruct
the jury on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor joyriding. (9/28/17 Tr., p. 288, L.
18 – p. 289, L. 5.)
The jury found McCoy guilty of grand theft by possession of stolen property. (R.,
pp. 145-146.) McCoy pled guilty to the habitual offender enhancement. (9/29/17Tr., p.
345, L. 14 – p. 351, L. 8.) The district court entered judgment and sentenced McCoy to
fourteen years with four years fixed. (R., pp. 173-177.) McCoy timely appealed. (R., pp.
178-181.)
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ISSUE
McCoy states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court’s instruction to the jury that it could find Mr. McCoy
guilty of grand theft if the State proved he either wrongfully took property
or knowingly possessed stolen property create a fatal variance with the
charging document, which specifically charged only the latter offense?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has McCoy failed to show fundamental error in the jury instructions?

4

ARGUMENT
The Jury Instructions Did Not Amount To Fundamental Error Because McCoy’s Defense
At Trial Was That He Took The Truck But Did Not Intend To Keep It
A.

Introduction
The state charged McCoy with grand theft by possession of stolen property under

Idaho Code § 18-2403(4). (R., pp. 100-101.) The district court instructed the jury on the
elements of grand theft. (R., pp. 128-131.) Instruction No. 12 told the jury that they
could find McCoy guilt of grand theft either through a “wrongful taking” as described in
Jury Instruction No. 13, or by “knowingly possessing stolen property,” as described in
Jury Instruction No. 14. (See id.) On appeal, McCoy argues, for the first time, that
Instruction No. 12 fatally varied from the Amended Information because the Amended
Information only alleged grand theft by “possession” and did not allege grand theft by a
“wrongful taking.” (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-11.) McCoy argues that this variance
constitutes fundamental error. (See id.) McCoy’s argument fails.
There was no variance between the Amended Information and Jury Instruction
No. 12. The Amended Information alleged a theft under Idaho Code § 18-2403(4). (See
R., pp. 100-101.) A charge of theft under Idaho Code § 18-2403 need not specify which
kind of theft is alleged, unless the defendant is charged with extortion. See I.C. § 182409.

McCoy was not charged with theft by extortion, therefore the Amended

Information alleging a theft under Idaho Code § 18-2403 was sufficient to include all
other types of theft under Idaho Code § 18-2403, including the type of theft described in
Jury Instruction No. 12.

5

Even if there was a variance, it was not fatal because McCoy was on notice of the
charged conduct and his defense was not impaired. In fact, McCoy’s defense at trial
depended on his wrongful taking of the truck. McCoy argued that he wrongfully took the
truck but that he did not intend to permanently deprive the owners of the truck, and thus
was only guilty of misdemeanor joyriding. (See, e.g., 9/28/17 Tr., p. 143, L. 15 – p. 146,
L. 24, p. 271, L. 3 – p. 275, L. 17, p. 324, L. 13 – p. 332, L. 14.) McCoy actually
objected to Instruction No. 14, the elements of grand theft by possession, on the grounds
that the only evidence presented was that he took the truck and there was no evidence that
someone else stole the truck. (9/28/17 Tr., p. 287, Ls. 3-18.) As a result, any variance
was not fatal and McCoy has failed to establish fundamental error.

B.

Standard Of Review
If an alleged error was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, it must be

reviewed under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245
P.3d 961, 980 (2010). In order to obtain relief under the fundamental error doctrine, a
defendant must demonstrate: (1) “one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional
rights were violated”; (2) the constitutional error is “clear or obvious” on the record
“without the need for any additional information,” including information “as to whether
the failure to object was a tactical decision”; and (3) “the error affected the defendant's
substantial rights,” by showing a reasonable possibility that the error “affected the
outcome of the trial court proceedings.” Id. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.
Whether an impermissible variance exists between a charging instrument and jury
instructions is a question of law over which the appellate court exercises free review.
6

State v. Sherrod, 131 Idaho 56, 57, 951 P.2d 1283, 1284 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing State v.
Colwell, 124 Idaho 560, 565, 861 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. McBride,
123 Idaho 263, 266, 846 P.2d 914, 917 (Ct. App. 1992)).

C.

McCoy Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error Because Any Alleged Variance
Was Not Fatal
The state charged McCoy with Grand Theft by Possession of Stolen property in

violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-2403(4), 18-2407(1)(b), 18-2409, and 19-309. (R., pp.
100-101.) The state alleged:
JAN M. BENNETTS, in and for the County of Ada, State of
Idaho, who in the name and by the authority of the State, prosecutes in its
behalf, comes now into District Court of the County of Ada, and states that
GARRETT M. MCCOY is accused by this Information of the crime(s) of:
GRAND THEFT BY POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY,
FELONY, I.C. § 18-2403(4), 2407(1)(b), 2409, 19-309, which crime(s)
were committed as follows:
That the defendant, GARRETT M. MCCOY, on or about the 4th
day of November 2016, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did
knowingly possess stolen property, to-wit: a 2014 Honda Ridgeline of a
value in excess of One Thousand Dollars, the property of Chanmaly
Walker, knowing the property to have been stolen, or under circumstances
as would reasonably induce him/her to believe that the property was
stolen, and with the intent to deprive the owner permanently of the use or
benefit of the property.
(R., pp. 100-101.) Jury Instruction No. 12 instructed the jury that they could find McCoy
guilty of grand theft if they found he wrongfully took the truck or if they found he
knowingly possessed the stolen truck. (R., p. 128.)
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INSTRUCTION NO. 12
There are different forms of Grand Theft, depending upon the
manner in which the theft was committed. The defendant GARRETT M.
MCCOY, is charged in Count I with the theft of a 2014 Honda Ridgeline.
The State alleges that such theft was committed either by wrongfully
taking the property, as described in Instruction No. 13, or by knowingly
possessing the stolen property, as described in Instruction No. 14. If you
are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimously agree that the
defendant committed the crime of Grand Theft, you should find the
defendant guilty. You are not required to agree as to which particular form
of theft the defendant committed.
(R., p. 128; see also 9/28/17 Tr., p. 292, L. 24 – p. 293, L. 13.) Instruction No. 13
provided the elements for grand theft by wrongful taking and Instruction No. 14 provided
the elements for grand theft by possession. (R., pp. 129-131; see also 9/28/17 Tr., p. 293,
L. 14 – p. 295, L. 8.) McCoy did not object to Jury Instruction Nos. 12 or 13. (See
9/28/17 Tr., p. 286, L. 6 – p. 289, L. 5.)
However, on appeal, McCoy claims Jury Instruction No. 12 created a fatal
variance because McCoy was never charged with grand theft by wrongful taking.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 8.) McCoy claims “the charging document did not fairly notify Mr.
McCoy that he would need to defend at trial against a charge of grand theft by wrongful
taking.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 9.) As McCoy did not raise this issue before the district
court he has to establish that the variance constituted fundamental error. (See Appellant’s
brief, p. 10.) McCoy fails to establish fundamental error because his due process rights
were not violated and any variance was not fatal. McCoy’s defense was not embarrassed
or misled by the variance.
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1.

Jury Instruction No. 12 Did Not Create A Fatal Variance And Thus
McCoy Has Failed To Establish That An Unwaived Constitutional Right
Was Violated

McCoy has failed to show a fatal variance in the jury instructions and thus has
failed to show an unwaived constitutional right was violated. “Jury instructions should
match the allegations in the charging document as to the means by which a defendant is
alleged to have committed the charged crime.” State v. Bernal, 164 Idaho 190, 195, 427
P.3d 1, 5 (2018) (citing State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 146–47, 176 P.3d 911, 918–19
(2007). “Failure to do so creates a variance.” Id. (citing State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327,
342, 256 P.3d 735, 750 (2011)).

“A variance becomes fatal when it violates due

process.” Id. (citing State v. Cariaga, 95 Idaho 900, 904, 523 P.2d 32, 36 (1974); De
Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937)).
The general rule that allegations and proof must correspond is
based upon the obvious requirements (1) that the accused shall be
definitely informed as to the charges against him, so that he may be
enabled to present his defense and not be taken by surprise by the evidence
offered at the trial; and (2) that he may be protected against another
prosecution for the same offense.
Id. (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 (1935)).
Idaho courts use a two-step process to determine whether a variance violates due
process. Id. (citing State v. Gas, 161 Idaho 588, 592, 388 P.3d 912, 916 (Ct. App. 2016)).
First, the court determines whether there was a variance between the Information and the
jury instruction. Id. (citing Gas, 161 Idaho at 592, 388 P.3d at 916). Second, if there is a
variance, then the court examines whether it rises to the level of prejudicial error
requiring reversal of the conviction. Id. (citing Gas, 161 Idaho at 592, 388 P.3d at 916).
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If the variance rises to the level of requiring a reversal the conviction then the variance is
considered “fatal.” Id. (citing Gas, 161 Idaho at 592, 388 P.3d at 916).
“A variance between a charging instrument and a jury instruction necessitates
reversal only when it deprives the defendant of the right to fair notice or leaves him or her
open to the risk of double jeopardy.” Id. (quoting Gas, 161 Idaho at 592, 388 P.3d at
916). This Court looks to see whether the defendant was misled or embarrassed in the
preparation or presentation of his or her defense. Id. (citing State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho
410, 418, 716 P.2d 1182, 1190 (1985)).
Here no variance existed because the Amended Information’s allegation of a nonextortion theft was sufficient to include all other types of theft under Idaho Code § 182403. See I.C. § 18-2409. Idaho Code § 18-2409 states:
(1) Where it is an element of the crime charged that property was
taken from the person or obtained by extortion, an indictment, complaint
or information for theft must so specify. In all other cases, an
indictment, information or complaint for theft is sufficient if it alleges
that the defendant stole property of the nature or value required for
the commission of the crime charged without designating the
particular way or manner in which such property was stolen or the
particular theory of theft involved.
(2) Proof that the defendant engaged in any conduct
constituting theft as defined in section 18-2403, Idaho Code, is
sufficient to support any indictment, information or complaint for
theft other than one charging theft by extortion. An indictment,
complaint or information charging theft by extortion must be supported by
proof establishing theft by extortion.
I.C. § 18-2409 (emphasis added, otherwise verbatim).)
There are several ways to commit grand theft, but it “generally does not need to be
pled in a particular way.” State v. Henderson, 113 Idaho 411, 412, 744 P.2d 795, 796 (Ct.
App. 1987) (citing I.C. § 18–2409). The statutory pleading requirements are met if the
10

information describes the nature and the value of the property allegedly stolen, identified
with certainty the time, place and persons or property owners involved. See State v.
Owen, 129 Idaho 920, 927, 935 P.2d 183, 190 (Ct. App. 1997) (due process was satisfied
even without a specific allegation in the information because the defendant was made
aware of the state’s evidence of theft at the preliminary hearing); State v. HerremanGarcia, 160 Idaho 642, 646–47, 377 P.3d 1105, 1109–10 (Ct. App. 2016) (state was
allowed to present a different method of grand theft at trial than the method alleged at the
preliminary hearing). Here, because Amended Information alleged grand theft under
Idaho Code § 18-2403, and no extortion was alleged, the Amended Information need not
include the specific type of grand theft.
However, the cases interpreting Idaho Code § 18-2409, specifically State v. Owen
and State v. Herreman-Garcia, did not apply Idaho Code § 18-2409 in the context of a
variance analysis. The Idaho Court of Appeals left open the possibility that a general
pleading of grand theft, which does not specify the type of grand theft and relies on Idaho
Code § 18-2409, may potentially encounter due process problems if there is no
preliminary hearing. See Owen, 129 Idaho at 929 n. 8, 935 P.2d at 191 n. 8. Here, there
was a preliminary hearing and thus the due process concerns raised by Owen are not
applicable in this case.
Even if a variance existed because the Amended Information only alleged McCoy
wrongfully possessed the stolen truck, it was not fatal, and did not violate McCoy’s
unwaived constitutional rights, because McCoy was not misled or embarrassed in the
preparation or presentation of his defense.
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McCoy was on notice that his stealing of the truck was at issue.

At the

preliminary hearing, Ms. Walker testified that, on November 4, 2016, her truck was taken
out of her driveway in Nampa as her son was getting ready for school. (12/6/16 Tr., p. 4,
L. 17 – p. 7, L. 17.) Sergeant Otter testified that McCoy admitted to him that he stole the
truck. (12/6/16 Tr., p. 11, L. 19 – p. 15, L. 6.) McCoy told Sergeant Otter that he was in
Nampa and the truck was “calling out to him,” so he took it. (12/6/16 Tr., p. 13, L. 20 –
p. 15, L. 6.)
Further, the state amended the Information to include a reference to Idaho Code §
19-309. (See
- - R., pp. 100-101; 9/27/17 Tr., p. 7, L. 10 – p. 9, L. 9.) Idaho Code § 19-309,
provides, in relevant part, “When property taken in one county by burglary, robbery, or
theft has been brought into another, the venue of the offense is in either county.” The
truck was stolen in Nampa, which is in Canyon County, and the trial was being held in
Ada County, where the tuck was recovered. At the time of the amendment, the district
court even pointed out that the defense had been on notice that the truck was stolen from
Nampa and driven to Ada County. (9/27/17 Tr., p. 12, L. 10 – p. 13, L. 3.)
As to the second interlineation of Idaho Code section 19-309, the Court
will allow that interlineation. The State is correct that it merely needs to
show that the crime was committed in the State of Idaho as an element it
needs to prove. 19-309 simply sets forth the venue. The case could have
been brought either in Ada County or in Canyon County if the car was
removed from Nampa. And that the defendant has been on notice based
on the discovery that the State has always allege that had this car was
removed from Nampa and driven to Ada County.
So this is not prejudicial or -- to the defendant to add this interlineation.
Again, the code sections are not revealed and it doesn't change the burden
the State has in proving that the crime was committed in the State of
Idaho. It is just a jurisdictional clarification that is technical in nature.
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(Id. (emphasis added, otherwise verbatim).) The Amended Information’s citation to
Idaho Code § 19-309 provided additional notice to McCoy that his conduct for stealing
the truck in Canyon County was at issue.
In a recent case the Idaho Supreme Court held that when the defendant is on
notice that the uncharged conduct is at issue in the trial, then the variance is not fatal. See
Bernal, 164 Idaho at 195-196, 427 P.3d at 5-6. Bernal was charged with reckless driving
on Five Mile Road. See id. However the jury instruction did not limit Bernal’s reckless
driving to Five Mile Road, and the state presented evidence and argument that Bernal’s
reckless driving occurred on both Five Mile Road and Granger Avenue. See id. The
Idaho Supreme Court found that this created a variance, but it was not a fatal variance
because Bernal’s driving on Granger Avenue was referenced in another count and thus he
was on notice that this driving on Granger Avenue was at issue and his defense was not
misled or embarrassed. See id. The same is true here. The Amended Information
included a reference to Idaho Code § 19-309, which put McCoy on notice that his conduct
in Canyon County was at issue, and the evidence at the preliminary hearing (which
included McCoy’s admission that he stole the truck in Canyon County), put McCoy on
notice that his conduct of stealing the truck from Canyon County was at issue in this case.
Further, McCoy’s defense was not embarrassed or misled. McCoy’s defense was
that he stole the truck, but that the did not intend to keep it and thus he was only guilty of
misdemeanor joyriding. (See e.g. 9/28/17 Tr., p. 143, L. 15 – p. 146, L. 24, p. 271, L. 3 –
p. 275, L. 17, p. 324, L. 13 – p. 332, L. 14.) During his closing argument McCoy argued
that he did not intend to permanently deprive the Walkers of their truck. (9/28/17 Tr., p.
324, L. 13 – p. 332, L. 14.) For example, McCoy argued, “If you truly take the car and
13

you intend to deprive somebody of that car, then you have some sort of plan. You park in
a garage. You take it someplace where no one is going to find it. You leave the State.
Things like that.” (9/28/17 Tr., p. 327, Ls. 4-8.) McCoy argued that Instruction No. 15
applied and that McCoy only intended to temporarily deprive the Walkers of their car.
(9/28/17 Tr., p. 327, L. 13 – p. 328, L. 7.) His defense was based upon the wrongful
taking and therefore including the wrongful taking jury instruction could not have misled
or embarrassed McCoy’s defense.
Further, during the jury instruction arguments, McCoy argued that the wrongful
possession instruction should not be given. (9/28/17 Tr., p. 286, L. 6 – p. 289, L. 5.)
McCoy argued that the only evidence admitted at trial was that he stole the truck and
there was no evidence that someone else stole the truck. (9/28/17 Tr., p. 286, L. 6 – p.
289, L. 5.) McCoy argued:
Judge, we do. We have an objection to number 14, juror [sic] instruction
number 14 being included as grand theft by stolen property. Jury
instructions have to be based on the evidence as presented at trial here, and
we have not heard any evidence or anything that talks about that this car
was somehow stolen and then picked up, that [McCoy] somehow obtained
it after it was taken from this driveway. In fact, we have evidence and
testimony all to the contrary, that it was taken from the driveway and
found Garden City. And so I don't believe that any testimony, any of the
evidence supports having this jury instruction. I believe it is confusing
again to the jury and we would ask that it be struck. Thank you.
(9/28/17 Tr., p. 287, Ls. 3-18.) Considering McCoy was on notice that his taking of the
truck was at issue and that his defense relied upon this fact, his defense was not misled or
embarrassed by any variance and, as such, was not fatal. McCoy has failed to show his
due process rights were violated and has failed the first prong of the fundamental error
analysis.
14

2.

McCoy Has Failed To Show That Any Fatal Variance Was Clear Or
Obvious On The Record And Has Not Shown That His Failure To Object
To Any Variance Was Not A Tactical Decision

McCoy argues that the error plainly exists without the need for additional
information and defense counsel’s failure to object “was clearly not a strategic decision,
as Mr. McCoy gained absolutely no strategic advantage by giving the jury an opportunity
to convict him under a different theory of grand theft than the one charged.” (See
Appellant’s brief, p. 10.) McCoy’s argument is without merit.
First, McCoy has failed to show from the record that there is a clear or obvious
fatal variance or that it was not a tactical decision not to object to Instruction No. 12. As
cited above, McCoy was on notice that his taking of the truck from Nampa was at issue in
the trial and his defense was not misled or embarrassed by the inclusion of Jury
Instruction No. 12. The record does not clearly show the variance was fatal. And, in fact,
it shows the opposite. For example, the district court noted that McCoy was on notice
regarding this truck theft from Canyon County. (See 9/27/17 Tr., p. 12, L. 10 – p. 13, L.
3.) In addition, at the preliminary hearing the state presented testimony that the truck was
stolen from Nampa and that McCoy admitted to taking the truck. (See 12/6/16 Tr., p. 4,
L. 17 – p. 7, L. 17, p. 11, L. 19 – p. 15, L. 6.) Further, McCoy appears to have made the
tactical decision not to object to the wrongful taking instruction because McCoy’s
defense at trial relied upon McCoy wrongfully taking the truck, but having no intention to
keep it. (See, e.g., 9/28/17 Tr., p. 143, L. 15 – p. 146, L. 24, p. 271, L. 3 – p. 275, L. 17,
p. 324, L. 13 – p. 332, L. 14.) McCoy argued that he was only guilty of the lesser
included offense of misdemeanor joyriding. (See id.) Thus it there is no clear fatal
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variance from the record, and McCoy has failed to show it was not a tactical decision to
not object to Instruction No. 12.

3.

The Harmless Error Prong Of The Fundamental Error Analysis Is Moot

The third prong of the fundamental error analysis is moot. If this court finds that
McCoy met the first and second prong of the fundamental error analysis, then this Court
will necessarily have found the variance to be fatal. If this Court finds a fatal variance
that is clear on the record then the state would concede the harmless error prong of the
fundamental error analysis. However, if this Court finds there was not a clear or obvious
fatal variance, then this third prong is also moot because Bernal will have failed to show
the first or second prongs of the fundamental error analysis.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 6th day of March, 2019.

/s/ Ted S. Tollefson
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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